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The 19th and 20th centuries saw a transformation in contraceptive
technologies and their take up. This led to a sexual revolution, which
witnessed a rise in premarital sex and out-of-wedlock births, and a
decline in marriage. The impact of contraception on married and
single life is analyzed here both theoretically and quantitatively. The
analysis is conducted using a model where people search for partners.
Upon nding one, they can choose between abstinence, marriage, and
a premarital sexual relationship. The model is confronted with some
stylized facts about premarital sex and marriage over the course of
the 20th century. Some economic history is also presented.
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1 Introduction
The forward motion of technology is unrelenting. Its hard to think of any-
thing else that has a¤ected the economy and society in such a fundamental
way. The Second Industrial Revolution occurred as the clock chimed in the
20th century. It ushered in electricity, the petrochemical industry, and the
internal combustion engine. Its ramications were enormous. Electricity
and the internal combustion engine changed the workplace since many man-
ual tasks could now be mechanized. This combined with fertilizers reduced
the need for farm labor. Along with the automobile it encouraged the rise
of cities and suburbs. Electricity also meant that the home could be mecha-
nized. The mechanization of the home and industry allowed women to enter
the labor force.1
The Information Age (or the Third Industrial Revolution) is also trans-
forming the economy and society. The ENIAC, the rst general purpose
computer, was set to work at the University of Pennsylvania in 1945. Ma-
chines like this were rst used in academic and industrial research to per-
form calculations that were impractical or impossible to do manually. By the
1960s it was apparent that computers could be used to sort, store, process,
and retrieve large volumes of data. Networking and the personal computers
came online in the 1970s and the 1980s. All of this reduced the need for
labor on factory oors, by using numerically controlled machines and exi-
ble manufacturing, and eliminated the need for battalions of clerks, pools of
secretaries, scores of purchasing and sales agents, and layers of supervisors
and administrators. The recent rise of articial intelligence is reducing the
need for routine mental labor.
Seemingly small inventions can also have a huge impact on the economy
and society. Take, for instance, the discovery of penicillin in 1928 by Sir
Alexander Fleming, which was the dawning of the antibiotic era. The lead-
ing causes of death in the United States changed from infectious illnesses
(cholera, diphtheria, pneumonia, smallpox, typhoid fever, plaque, syphilis,
tuberculosis, typhus) to noninfectious ones (cardiovascular disease, cancer,
and stroke). At the beginning of the 20th century life expectancy was 47
years compared with 79 years today. Better health and longer lives have
a¤ected educational attainment, labor-force participation, retirement, and
1The impact of technology on family life is the subject of the prescient book by Ogburn
and Nimko¤ (1955) and more recently by Greenwood (2018).
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savings. Contraception is another small invention with profound implica-
tions.
Technological innovations such as these can be analyzed using quantita-
tive theory. Quantitative-theoretic history aims to develop economic models
of historical issues. The models generally start at the level of prot maxi-
mization by rms and/or utility maximization by individuals and then ag-
gregate up to get a description of the economy as a whole. There are several
key ingredients in such an approach. First, is posing an interesting histori-
cal question. Second, is providing an historical narrative for the questions
background. Third, is the development of an economic model to address
the question. Fourth, is analyzing the model to glean intuition about its
mechanics and establish any theoretical propositions. Fifth, is simulating
the model to see if it can delivery a viable explanation of the historical data
surrounding the question of interest. The analysis may end there but often
counterfactual experiments are entertained. Hence, quantitative theory can
take data and ideas from economic history and address them using the tool
kit of modern macroeconomics. The question to be addressed here is: How
did technological progress in contraception inuence the decline in marriage
over the course of the 20th century? The analysis will follow the above ve
steps.
1.1 Quantitative-Theoretic History: Some Examples
Early examples of using quantitative theory to address historical questions
are the works by Cooley and Ohanian (1997), Greenwood and Yorukoglu
(1997), and Ohanian (1997). Cooley and Ohanian (1997) and Ohanian (1997)
study whether it would have been better to nance World War II by debt
or taxation. Their nding is that raising taxation in war times, as Keynes
suggested, is a bad idea. Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) study three in-
dustrial revolutions and nd that they are characterized by plunging prices
for new technologies, productivity slowdowns, and rising income inequality.
They model this phenomena.
Some more recent examples are Cole and Ohanian (2004), Greenwood,
Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke (2005), Hansen and Prescott (2002), Kopecky
(2011), Kopecky and Suen (2010), and Vandenbrouke (2008). Cole and
Ohanian (2004) argue that Roosevelts New Deal policies, by strengthen-
ing the power of monopolies and unions, prolonged the Great Depression.
This is in stark contrast with the conventional fawning view of the New
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Deal. The secular decline in U.S. fertility from 1800, which was briey in-
terrupted by the baby boom, is addressed in Greenwood, Seshadri, and Van-
denbroucke (2005). The transition from the preindustrial to the industrial
era is modeled by Hansen and Prescott (2002), who emphasize the switch
from land-intensive to capital-intensive production technologies. Caucutt,
Cooley, and Guner (2013) built on Hansen and Prescott (2002) to study the
emergence of the social security system along this transition. In 1880 more
than 75 percent of 65-year-old males were still working, compared with only
20 percent in 2000. Kopecky (2005) analyzes the rise in retirement over the
course of the 20th century. Kopecky and Suen (2010) develop a model of a
city with two modes of transportation, namely buses and cars, and address
the impact of the automobile on suburbanization between 1910 and 1970.
The expansion of the American West is addressed in Vandenbrouke (2008),
using a model that incorporates endogenous fertility and migration. Last,
some of the literature on marriage discussed in Section 10 also falls within the
category of quantitative-theoretic history; viz., Albanesi and Olivetti (2016),
Fernandez-Villaverde, Greenwood, and Guner (2014), Greenwood and Guner
(2009, 2010), Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005), Knowles and Van-
denbroucke (2019), and Vandenbroucke (2014).
2 The Decline in Marriage
Since the best way to learn about someone else is by being
together, intensive search is more e¤ective when unwed couples
spend considerable time together, perhaps including trial mar-
riages. Yet when contraceptives are crude and unreliable, trial
marriages and other premarital contact greatly raise the risk of
pregnancy. The signicant increase during this century in the fre-
quency of trial marriages and other premarital contact has been in
part a rational response to major improvements in contraceptive
techniques, and is not decisive evidence that young people now
value sexual experiences more than they did in the past. Gary S.
Becker (1991, p. 326)
Since World War II there has been a dramatic increase in the fraction of
young women who have never been married and consequently an associated
rise in the age of rst marriage. These two trends are shown in Figure 1. (All
4
1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
N
ev
er
-M
ar
rie
d,
 fr
ac
tio
n
Year
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
M
ed
ia
n 
Ag
e 
of
 M
ar
ria
ge
Age, right
Never Married, left
Figure 1: Marriage in the United States, 1880-2015/8. The gure plots the
fraction of the female population, ages 18-30, that are never married and the
median age of rst marriage for women. See the Data Appendix for all data
sources.
data sources are provided in the Data Appendix.) In 1900 only 48 percent
of women in the 18 to 30 age range had never been married. By 2015 this
had jumped to 77 percent. The median age of a rst marriage rose from 21
to 25. The hypothesis to be entertained here is that this is due, at least in
part, to technological improvements in contraception. As the failure rate for
contraception fell, the cost of a sexual relationship for a single woman also
declined. This altered the cost/benet calculation for marrying a partner
at hand, favoring the option of postponing marriage until a more suitable
partner is found.
Somewhat paradoxically as contraception improved, the number of non-
marital births rose. Over the course of the 20th century non-marital births
rose continuously, as is displayed by the right panel of Figure 2. This occurred
for two reasons: the fraction of never-married women has increased (Figure 1
above) and never-married women are more sexually active today than in the
past (which is discussed below). The left panel shows that non-marital births
have increased throughout the postwar period for every age group of women.
Additionally, the non-marital births for women in the adult age groups now
exceed that for teenagers.
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Figure 2: Non-Marital Births in the United States. The right panel shows
non-marital births as a percentage of all births, 1920-2017. The left panel
displays non-marital births by age group per 1,000 women at various times
in the postwar period.
Never-married women are much more sexually active today than in yes-
terday. The percentage of 20-year-old women experiencing premarital sex
rose precipitously over the course of the 20th century. Only 8 percent of
women born around 1900 would have had premarital sex before age 20, com-
pared with 76 percent born between 1978 and 88see Figure 3. Furthermore,
the circa 1900 cohort of women would have had around sexual 2.8 partner
before marriage, including her husband, while the 1978-88 cohort had 7.0
partners.
A marital search model is used to examine the impact on marriage of
technological innovation in contraception. The model is setup in Section 4. In
particular, each period a single searches for a partner on a marriage market. If
the person is matched, they can choose to have a casual relationship with the
partner or enter into marriage. There are two types of casual relationships;
viz., sexual and nonsexual ones. A nonmarital sexual love a¤air involves the
risk of pregnancy, which depends on the e¤ectiveness of contraception.
When choosing between a casual relationship and marriage a person ex-
amines the marriageability of their partner versus the momentary utility from
a nonmarital romance and then continuing the search for a more marriage-
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Figure 3: Premarital Sex in 20th-Century America. The graph plots the
percentage of women, by various cohorts, who had premarital sex by ages
20 and 30, left axis. It also charts the number of partners these women had
before marriage, right axis.
able mate. This choice is presented in Section 5. To keep things simple,
the analysis abstracts from divorce. Likewise, when deciding between an
abstinent or a sexual relationship the individual weighs o¤ the extra utility
from having sex against the expected cost of an out-of-wedlock birth. This
decision is formalized in Section 6. It is established theoretically that an
improvement in contraceptive technology leads to: a decline in the rate of
marriage (Section 5); an increase in the fraction of the population that are
never-married (Section 7.1); a postponement in the age of marriage (Sec-
tion 7.1); and a rise in the fraction of singles that are sexual active (Section
7.2). Out-of-wedlock births may rise or fall with an advance in contraceptive
technology (Section 7.4).
The theoretical model is subjected to some quantitative analysis in Sec-
tion 8. To begin with, a series measuring the failure rate of contraception is
constructed. The odds of a pregnancy for a sexually active women dropped
precipitously between 1900 and 2015-18. The analysis focuses on two periods
in U.S. history, 1900 and 2000. The model is calibrated to see if it can match
facts from the U.S. data such as the decline in the fraction of women who
have ever been married, the fraction of single women who had premarital sex,
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the increase in out-of-wedlock births, and the waxing in the number of sex-
ual partners before marriage. The developed framework matches these facts
well. The mapping between data targets and parameter values is unpacked
by computing the Jacobian for the model.
Last, a review of the relevant economics literature is presented in Section
10. The discussion now turns to a brief history of contraception.
3 Contraception in the 19th and 20th Cen-
turies
Birth control advanced along two fronts in the nineteenth century. First,
knowledge about contraception began to disseminate. Second, there was
improvement in contraceptive technologies. Historically, fertility for married
women was controlled in the United States, albeit very imperfectly, using
primitive contraception. These technologies would have been too risky to
use for unmarried women.
Using a reproductive period of 25 years and an interval between births of
1.5 years, Livi-Bacci (2012) estimates that a reasonable upper bound on the
number of children that a woman can have is 16.7. No society has approached
this theoretical maximal rate of reproduction. The closest examples are the
17th century Québécois and the interwar Canadian Hutterites with total
fertility rates of 11.4 and 9, respectively.2 The total fertility rate for white
women in the United States fell from 7.1 children in 1800 to just 1.9 kids in
2015, as can be seen from the right panel of Figure 4. The gure also plots the
complementary cumulative distribution functions over births for four cohorts
of married women in the United States before the baby boomsee the left
panel. First, as can be seen, the distribution of births is well within the
biological maximum. Second, the distribution functions are stochastically
decreasing with the year of the cohort. That is, as time progresses a woman
was less likely to have a large number of births. For example, the rst
group of bars shows that 15 percent of woman born between 1835 and 1839
had 10 or more births. This had dropped to just 1.7 percent for the 1905-
09 cohort. At the other end of the spectrum, it can be deduced from the
di¤erence in the heights between the fth and sixth groups of bars that
2Galor and Klemp (2019), in their study of the fecundity of early French Canadian
women, relay that one woman had 22 o¤spring.
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Figure 4: Fertility in the United States. The right panel shows the drop in
the total fertility rate for white women from 1800 to 2015. Complementary
cumulative distribution functions over children ever born for four cohorts of
ever-married women are plotted in the left panel. As such, the vertical axis
presents the percentage of women who had a number of births greater than
or equal to that indicated on the horizontal axis.
just 7.7 percent of women in the 1835-39 had no children, while 21 percent
did for those born between 1905 and 1909. The mean number of births
declines with the womens birth years. The mean of 2.5 for the 1905-09 cohort
compares with a total fertility rate of 1.9 in 2015. The 1905-09 cohort would
have been in their fties by the time the pill was invented. So, the graph
clearly illustrates that somehow family size was limited well before the advent
of modern contraception. Historically, family size was limited by abortion,
abstinence enforced by the prohibition and stigmatization of premarital sex,
contraception, child abandonment and infanticide, and delaying the age of
marriage (which was important in light of short lifespans).
3.1 Dissemination of Information
In 1823 Francis Place, an English social reformer, circulated a pamphlet in
London titled To the Married of Both Sexes of the Working People. In it he
wrote [Himes (1963, pp. 216-217)]
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What is done by other people is this. A piece of soft sponge is
tied by a bobbin or penny ribbon, and inserted just before the
sexual intercourse takes place, and is withdrawn again as soon as
it has taken place. Many tie a piece of sponge to each end of the
ribbon, and they take care not to use the same sponge again until
it has been washed.
An early nineteenth century sponge is shown in the right panel of Figure 5.
In America, Dr. Charles Knowlton (1832) recommended douching in a
pamphlet titled The Fruits of Philosophy (Chapter III on Promoting and
Checking Conception), writing
It consists in syringing the vagina immediately after connection
with a solution of sulphate of zinc, of alum, pearl-ash, or any salt
that acts chemically on the semen, and at the same time produces
no unfavorable e¤ect on the female.
The rst edition was published anonymously, given the puritanical beliefs
of the time. For trying to distribute his book, Knowlton was imprisoned
for three months. Figure 5, left panel, shows an early vaginal syringe used
for douching. Last in Moral Physiology; or, A Brief and Plain Treatise on
the Population Question (Chapter VI) Robert Dale Owen (1842) advocated
withdrawal, stating
Among the modes of preventing conception which may have pre-
vailed in various countries, that which has been adopted, and is
now practised by the cultivated classes on the continent of Eu-
rope, by the French, the Italians, and, I believe, by the Germans
and Spaniards, consists of complete withdrawal, on the part of
the man, immediately previous to emission. This is, in all cases,
e¤ectual.
The dissemination of knowledge about birth control picked up dramati-
cally at the start of the twentieth century. In 1916 Margaret Sanger opened
the rst birth control clinic in America. Some 400 women received instruc-
tion about contraception before the clinic was closed by the police nine days
later. Sanger served a thirty day jail sentence in 1917 for opening the clinic.
Following a 1918 ruling by the New York State Court of Appeals in The
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Figure 5: A 19th century pewter vaginal syringe with its case is displayed
in the left panel. The right panel shows a rubber sponge, in its original box
(circa 1901-1930). Sponges were widely used as contraception in the early
1900s. Sponges were often soaked in spermicidal agents, of varying e¤ective-
ness. In a 1914 pamphlet Family Limitation, Margaret Sanger relayed that
absorbing boric acid into the sponge yielded "satisfactory results." Sources:
wellcomecollection.org and Science Museum, London.
People of the State of New York v. Margaret H. Sanger, which allowed con-
traception to be distributed by physicians, she opened the rst continuously
operational birth control clinic in 1923. The clinic was sta¤ed by female
physicians and counselors. In London, England, Mary Stopes did much the
same thing, opening in 1921 the rst birth control clinic in the British Em-
pire. The rst medical book in America aimed at providing physicians with
up-to-date scientic information about contraception was the Technique of
Contraception: The Principle and Practice of Anti-Conceptional Methods,
written by Dr. James F. Cooper in 1928. A table in the book (p. 221) gave
failures rates for condoms, douching, cervical stems, spermicides, withdrawal,
etc. The book was dedicated to Margaret Sanger.
3.2 Technological Advance
There also was considerable technological advance in contraception over this
period. Start with the condom. In 1844 The United States Practical Receipt
Book (p. 87) provided instructions on how to make a condom:
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Figure 6: The left panel shows a European condom, made from animal gut,
in a waxed paper envelope (circa 1801-1850). The right panel pictures a re-
usable English rubber condom in its original box, complete with instructions
(circa 1948). Source: Science Museum, London.
Take the caecum of the sheep; soak it rst in water, turn it on
both sides, then repeat the operation in a weak ley of soda, which
must be changed every four or ve hours for ve or six successive
times; then remove the mucus membrane with the nail; sulphur,
wash in clean water, and then in soap and water; rinse, inate,
and dry. Next cut it to the required length and attach a piece of
ribbon to the open end. Used to prevent infection or pregnancy.
The di¤erent qualities consist of extra pains being taken in the
above process, and in polishing, scenting, &c.
Packages of a dozen rubber condoms were selling in 1890 for 50 cents. At
the time a tradesman would have earned an hourly wage of 20 cents, so this
translates into a time price of 2.5 hours of work. Quality control was an
issue; however, giving condoms a bad name. According to Tietze (1963), a
study conducted in 1934-1935 found the following distribution over defects:
burst, 29.4 per cent; holes, 15.2 per cent; aws, 14.5 per cent; total, 59.1
per cent. This led to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration controlling
quality standards. Also, Dr. Cooper in his 1928 medical book noted another
disadvantage: Blunting of sensation. Frequent refusal by male.The quality
of condoms had increased dramatically by the 1960s, making them one of the
most e¤ective forms of contraception.
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Figure 7: The drawing that was submitted with John B. Beers1846 patent
application for his Wifes Protector contraceptive device.
In 1846 the United States Patent O¢ ce granted patent number 4,729.
The introduction to the patent specication read:
Be it known that I, John B. Beers, of the city of Rochester, in
the county of Monroe and State of New York, have invented a
new Instrument called the wifes protector,the design of which
is to Prevent conception.
The drawing that was submitted with his patent application is shown in
Figure 7. The specication of Beersletters patent is provided in Appendix
11. His wifes protector instrument inserted a hoop covered by a oil-silk
membrane that prevented semen from entering the uterus. An interesting
feature of the patent specication is that is explicitly stated that it was
intended to prevent pregnancy, a risky venture at the time. Cervical caps
and diaphragms also were introduced in the 1800s. The left panel of Figure 8
shows a late 18th century German pessary. The pessary was an intracervical
device (IUC). It worked after conception by provoking a foreign inammatory
reaction that stops a newly fertilized embryo from implanting and growing
in the lining of the uterus.
There was also technological improvement in spermicides, used with or
without other contraceptives such as condoms, diaphragms, sponges, etc.
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An English pharmacist introduced in 1885 a suppository made out of cocoa
butter and quinine sulfate. Others at the time combined cocoa butter, which
melted at a low temperature, with boric acid, tannic acid, or bichloride of
mercury. In 1937 phenylmercuric acetate was introduced in a product called
Volper. This was a highly e¤ective spermicide, but was subsequently banned
in the United States because of concerns about mercury. In the 1950s surface
active agents (surfactants) were introduced. These are non-irritating. On
this, in the past many products were used as spermicides. Sanger (1914)
mentions Lysol in Family Limitation and Belsky (1975) relays that Coca-
Cola was used in India.
In the 1920s German gynecologist Ernst Grafenberg developed the in-
trauterine device (IUD), displayed in the right panel of Figure 8. Both the
pessary and this early IUD were infection prone. And it should be noted that
pelvic infections could only be dealt with easily after the introduction of an-
tibiotics in the 1940s. Fast forwarding to 1967, Howard Tatum and Jamie
Zipper developed the rst copper-bearing IUD. It was T shaped and made of
inert plastics, which made it t better and less vulnerable to infection. Zipper
had shown that copper reduced the risk of pregnancy in rabbits. Interest-
ingly, Grafenbergs IUD also contained copper, but its e¤ect on preventing
pregnancy went unnoticed.
Also in the 1920s and 1930s two gynecologists, Kyusaku Ogino and Her-
mann Knaus, provided an accurate tracking of the ovulation cycle. This
provide a scientic basis for the rhythm method. This resulted in inexpen-
sive devices, such as the Rythmeter, which calculated the time of ovulation
and the periods of fertility and infertility. This evolved into more modern
methods, such as Sympto-Thermal Method of the late 1970s, which combines
the rhythm calendar with changes in body temperature and cervical mucus.
The pill symbolizes technological improvement in contraception. It syn-
thesizes two hormones, estrogen and progestin, in order to prevent ovulation.
Scientists discovered and isolated hormones in the 1930s. Manufacturing
them was expensive and slow, though. Russell Marker developed an e¢ cient
method for doing so in the 1950s. Around that time Carl Djerassi synthesized
a progestin that could be taken orally. Capitalizing on these earlier break-
throughs, biologists Min Chueh Chang and Gregory Pincus teamed together
with obstetrician John Rock to develop the pill, which was approved by the
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Figure 8: A gold wishbone stem pessary is pictured in the left panel. It was
developed around 1880 in Germany. The right side panel shows a Grafenberg
IUD, circa 1920s. Source: Science Museum, London.
FDA in 1960. Today transdermal patches, implants, and injections can be
used to deliver estrogen and progestin.
4 Setup
Each period a new cohort of adult singles enters the economy. The initial
size of each cohort is one, with a per-period survival rate for a person of .
The analysis will focus on the steady states. Given this, the time-invariant
size of the population is 1=(1  ).
Now, imagine the problem facing a single. Suppose that this single will
meet a partner in the current period with probability . If so, the person can
decide to have either a marital or nonmarital relationship with their partner.
There are two types of nonmarital love a¤airs: sexual and nonsexual ones. An
abstinent romantic entanglement yields a momentary utility level of a  0.
A sexual liaison results in a current utility level of l > a. Libido, l, for the
current love a¤air is drawn from the cumulative distribution function L(l),
with associated density function L1(l). A nonmarital sexual relationship
may result in an out-of-wedlock birth. With probability  the person avoids
a pregnancy, while with probability 1  they do not. Let an out-of-wedlock
birth have a cost of O. Finally, if the person marries, then they get the
random lifetime utility w. The value of being wed, w  0, is drawn from
the cumulative distribution function W (w), with associated density function
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Figure 9: Timing of Events. The diagram shows the timing of events within
a period. The circles denote nodes when an individual is single, whereas the
diamonds represent nodes when they are married. A single matches with
probability . If matched, they remain single with probability w, have sex
with odds 1   l, and have an out-of-wedlock birth (owb) with probability,
1  . The determination of w and l is discussed in the next two sections.
W1(w). The value of w is known at the time of the marriage decision, but
the level of joy, l, from a casual sexual endeavour is not. Marriage is an
absorbing state. People discount the future at rate , which incorporates the
survival rate of .
5 Married or Single Life?
The key step in the analysis is formulating the recursion that denes the
expected lifetime utility of being single in the current period, S. Suppose
that the person is single in the current period. With probability 1    the
person remains unmatched. In this case, they realize no current utility. Since
they enter next period as unmarried, the discounted expected utility for an
unmatched single is S. With probability  they meet someone. If so, the
single can choose to marry or remain single. On the one hand, married life
yields the lifetime utility w. On the other hand, let the expected momentary
utility for a matched single beN(), which is increasing in the odds of safe sex
. The function N() is unpacked in the next section. The matched single
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will enter next period still single, which has the discounted continuation value
of S. Hence, the expected lifetime utility from single life is N() + S.
Clearly, a matched single will choose the option that yields the highest level
of expected lifetime utility. The decision to marry in the current period can
be cast as
Marry, if w  N() + S;
Remain Single, if w < N() + S:
There will exist a threshold rule for w, denoted by w, such that
Marry, if w  w;
Remain Single, if w < w;
where w is the solution to
w = N() + S: (1)
It is now easy to see that S satises the recursion
S = (1  )S| {z }
unmatched
+ E[maxfN() + S;wg]| {z }
matched
;
where recall that the marriage decision is made after the value for w is real-
ized. The above recursion can then be rewritten as
S = (1  )S + fW (w)[N() + S]| {z }
w
+
Z
w
wdW (w)g;
which implies that
S =
W (w)w + 
R
w wdW (w)
1  (1  ) : (2)
Therefore, using (1) and (2), at the threshold
w = N() + [
W (w)w +
R
w wdW (w)
1  (1  ) ]:
So how does contraception a¤ect marriage? To see this, totally di¤eren-
tiate the above equation with respect to  and w to get
dw
d
=
N1()
1  W (w)=[1  (1  )] > 0:
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In obtaining and signing this expression three facts are worth noting. First,
the expected momentary utility for a matched single is increasing in the odds
of safe sex, , implying N1() > 0again, this will be established in the next
section. Second, at the threshold d[W (w)w + 
R
w wdW (w)]=dw
 =
W (w). Third,
1 W (w)=[1  (1 )] =  (1 f1 [1 W (w)]g=[1  (1 )] > 0:
Intuitively speaking, when contraception becomes more e¤ective there is
a hike in the expected momentary utility for a matched single, N(); this
is established below in Proposition 3. As a result, matched singles become
choosier about who they will marry and the threshold value of love that has
to be met for a marriage, w, moves up. The situation is portrayed in Figure
10. For a matched individual the value of marriage is just w. This is shown
by the 450 degree line marked w. The expected lifetime value of life for a
person who is currently single is shown by the line labelled N()+ S. This
line is not a function of the realized value for w, as can be seen by inspecting
equation (2). The threshold value for w, or w, at which the individual is
indi¤erent between marriage and single life occurs where the w andN()+S
lines intersect. Suppose that contraception improves; in other words, let 
rise. The expected value of single life moves up, as shown by the shift in
the curve from N() + S to N(0) + S 0. This fact is established below.
The w curve does not shift, since the random draw for married life is not a
function of . As a result, the threshold value for marriage, w, increases
from w to w0. This causes the fraction of matched singles who choose not
to marry to rise from W (w) to W (w0). The above analysis is summarized
by the proposition below.
Proposition 1 (Marriage Rate) An improvement in contraception, or an
increase in , leads to a decline in the marriage rate, 1  W (w), propelled
by an increase in w.
Interestingly, the expected lifetime utilities for both married and single
lives, f1=[1  W (w)]g R
w wdW (w) and S, increase. For married life, it is
straightforward to calculate that
d
 f1=[1 W (w)]g R
w wdW (w)

d
=
1
1 W (w) [
1
1 W (w)
Z
w
wdW (w)  w]W1(w)dw

d
> 0;
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Figure 10: The determination of w andW (w). The threshold for marriage,
w, is determined where the N() + S and w lines intersect. To the left of
w a person will choose single life, because the N()+S curve lies above the
w one. To the right the opposite happens. An increase in the e¤ectiveness of
contraception, , results in the N() + S curve shifting up to N(0) + S 0 .
As a consequence the threshold for marriage moves higher or rightward from
w to w0. The fraction of matched singles choosing not to marry then rises
from W (w) to W (w0).
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where the term in brackets on the righthand side is greater than 0. The
expected lifetime value of married life rises because the expected value of
single life has improved. This allows singles to be pickier about their marriage
partner. For single life, it follows from equation (2) that
dS
d
=
W (w)
1  (1  )
dw
d
> 0:
This justies the upward shift of the N()+S curve, following an increase in
, that is shown in Figure 10by assumption N() is increasing in . Single
life improves because there is a boost in the expected momentary utility for
a matched single, N(), due to the fact that premarital sex is now safer.
6 An Abstinent or Sexual NonMarital Rela-
tionship?
Consider the decision facing a matched single who has decided not to marry.
An abstinent relationship yields a momentary utility value of a, while for a
sexual one it depends on libido, l. At this time the person knows the value
of l. On the one hand, a sexual endeavour leads to the thrill l. On the other
hand, the person may become pregnant with probability 1    and su¤er
the cost of an out-of-wedlock birth, O. Therefore, the expected momentary
utility from a sexual relationship is l   (1  )O.
The utility for a matched single who has decided not to marry and sub-
sequently drawn a value for l is given by
maxfa; l   (1  )Og:
Hence, the decision to have a nonmarital sexual relationship is described by
Abstinent, l  a+ (1  )O;
Sexual Relationship, l > a+ (1  )O:
There will exist a threshold rule for l, denoted by l, such that
Abstinent, if l  l;
Sexual Relationship, if l > l;
where l is given by
l = a+ (1  )O:
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Therefore, the odds of abstinent and sexual relationships, contingent on
being matched, are L(l) and 1   L(l). This implies that the fraction of
singles having premarital sex is [1 L(l)]. As the e¢ cacy of contraception,
, improves, the probability of an out-of-wedlock birth for a sexually active
single drops. So, the expected cost, (1 )O, of being sexually active declines.
As a result, there will be more sexually active singles. Figure 11 illustrates
the situation. The 450 line marked l in the upper panel is the benet from
premarital sex. The horizontal line labeled a+ (1  )O represents the cost
of premarital sex. This has two components; namely, the forgone value of
abstinence, a, and the expected cost of an out-of-wedlock birth, (1   )O.
The threshold level of libido, l, is determined in the upper panel where
the l and a + (1   )O lines intersect or where the cost and benet of sex
are equalized. The lower panel plots the cumulative distribution function
L(l). As such it gives the odds of abstinence, L(l), conditional on a match.
When contraception improves, the cost of premarital sex falls so that the
a+(1 )O line moves down to a+(1 0)O, which results in l dropping to
l0. The fraction of matched singles that pick abstinence declines from L(l)
to L(l0).
Proposition 2 (Sexually Active Singles) The fraction of singles in a sexual
relationship, [1  L(l)], is increasing in the odds of safe sex, .
Proof. Its easy to see that

1  dL(l)
d
= L1(l
)O > 0:
The expected momentary utility of not marrying for a matched single is
N() = L(l)a+
Z
l
ldL(l)  [1  L(l)](1  )O:
The level of expected utility for a matched single improves with technological
progress in contraception for two reasons. First, for a sexually active single
the odds of an out-of-wedlock birth have declined. Second, a single is more
likely to be sexually active, since 1 L(l) rises, and having sex yields a higher
level of expected utility than abstinence because
R
l ldL(l)  (1  )O > a.
Proposition 3 (Current Utility for a Matched Single) The level of current
expected utility for a matched single, N(), is increasing in the odds of safe
sex, ; i.e., N1() > 0.
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Figure 11: The determination of l and L(l). The threshold level of libido,
l, occurs where the l and a + (1   )O lines in the upper panel intersect.
An increase in  lowers the cost of premarital sex, so that a+(1 )O shifts
down to a + (1   0)O. As a result, l drops to l0. The odds of abstinence
for a matched single fall, consequently, from L(l) to L(l0), as shown by the
lower panel.
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Proof. Di¤erentiating with respect to  yields
N1() = L1(l
)O[ a+ l   (1  )O] + [1  L(l)]O
= [1  L(l)]O > 0;
where use is made of the facts that dL(l)=d =  L1(l)O and l = a+ (1 
)O. Therefore, the momentary expected value of being a matched single
rises with the odds of safe sex, .
7 Statistical Mechanics
7.1 Marriage by Age
How many people will be married by a given age in the population? Recall
that each period a cohort of new adult singles enters the economy. This
cohort initially has unit mass but its size atrophies over time according to
the survival rate . Follow this cohort as it ages period by period. Suppose
that at the end of period j  1 there are sj 1 singles around from the cohort.
Then, there will be sj 1 singles around at the beginning of period j. Out
of this, sj 1 people match implying that the number of marriages is
nj  [1 W (w)]sj 1;where s0  1=:
The number of singles in the cohort will then evolve according to
sj = sj 1   nj = [1  + W (w)]jj 1:
The term on the right is easy to explain. If a person enters a period single,
then the odds of them exiting the period single are given by 1 +W (w).
On this the probability of not matching is 1   , while the probability of
matching and not marrying is W (w). So, the odds of not marrying at the
end of j periods are [1    + W (w)]j while the chance of surviving this
long is j 1. To summarize, the cohort evolves in the manner displayed in
Table 1.
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Marriage Statistics for a Cohort by Age
Age Newly Married, n Remaining Single, s Total Married, m Surviving
1 n1 = [1 W (w)] s1 = 1  + W (w) m1 = n1 1
2 n2 = [1 W (w)]s1 s2 = [1  + W (w)]2 m2 = m1 + n2 
...
...
...
...
...
j nj = [1 W (w)]sj 1 sj = [1  + W (w)]jj 1 mj = mj 1 + nj j 1
Table 1: The evolution of a cohort by age. Each period a new cohort of unit
mass enters the economy. The table gives the fractions by age of the original
cohort that are newly married, single, married, and surviving. In a steady
state the total size of the population is 1=(1   ). An entry in a cell also
represents number of people in the population in the designated situation.
To get the fraction of the population in this case just divide by 1=(1  ).
The impact of contraception on the married and never-married popula-
tions can now be analyzed. The fraction of the age-j population that is never
married is
sj
j 1
;
while portion of the population up to and including age j that is never
married is Pj
i=1 siPj
i=1 
i 1 : (3)
Now suppose that the odds of safe sex, , improve due to technological
progress in contraception. From Proposition 3 single life becomes more en-
joyable. Therefore, a matched single will become pickier about who they
marry; that is, w rises from Proposition 1. The fraction of never-married
individuals in the population at large moves up, as a consequence.
Proposition 4 (Never-Married Population) The fraction of the population
that is never married, as dened by (3), is increasing in the e¢ cacy of con-
traception, .
Proof. Using the fact that sj = [1 +W (w)]jj 1, it is immediate that
dsj
d
= j[1  + W (w)]j 1j 1W1(w)dw

d
> 0;
where the sign follows from Proposition 1.
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The average age of marriage for the age-j population isPj
i=1 iniPj
i=1 ni
. (4)
One may conjecture that an increase in the e¢ cacy of contraception will
postpone the mean age of marriage because the rate of marriage at any age
drops by Proposition 1. This is true, but the logic is not so straightfor-
ward because the number of the age-i newly married in the population, ni,
decreases in both the numerator and denominator of (4).
Proposition 5 (Mean and Median Ages of Marriage) The mean and median
ages of marriage are increasing in the e¢ cacy of contraception, .
Proof. See the Theory Appendix.
7.2 Premarital Sex
Let vj 1 represent the size of the age-(j 1) population that has never had sex.
The size of the age-j populace that hasnt had sex is then given by vj = [1 
+W (w)L(l)]vj 1, where v0  1=. To understand this expression, rst
note that only vj 1 of the original age-(j  1) virgin population will survive
until age j. Second, out this the fraction 1   will remain unmatched. The
proportion  will match, but from this segment the fraction W (w)L(l) will
choose both not to marry and not to have sex with their partner. Therefore,
the fraction of the age-j population that has never had sex is
vj
j 1
:
Now,
d(vj=
j 1)
d
= jf1  + W (w)L(l)gj 1
 fW1(w)L(l)dw

d|{z}
+
+W (w)L1(l)
dl
d|{z}
 
g R 0:
This expression is ambiguous because while safer sex leads to a decrease in
the number of age-j singles who are abstinent, via a drop in the threshold
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level of libido, l, it also increases the pool of age-j singles, through a rise in
the threshold value for marriage, w.
Additionally, there are age-j marrieds who didnt have premarital sex. For
example, at age j there will be [1  W (w)]vj 1 individuals who marry
but didnt have premarital sex. So, the fraction of the age-j population that
didnt have premarital sex is
vj + [1 W (w)]
Pj
i=1 
j+1 ivi 1
j 1
:
The fraction of the age-j single population that has never had sex is
vj
sj
=
[1  + W (w)L(l)]jj 1
[1  + W (w)]jj 1 = [
1  + W (w)L(l)
1  + W (w) ]
j:
Proposition 6 (Premarital Sex) The fraction of the age-j single population,
1   vj=sj, that has had premarital sex is increasing in the odds of safe sex,
.
Proof. The proposition holds because
d(vj=sj)
d
= j[
1  + W (w)L(l)
1  + W (w) ]
j 1
 [1  + W (w
)]W (w)L1(l)dl=d   (1  )W1(w)[1  L(l)]dw=d
[1  + W (w)]2 < 0:
7.3 Number of Sexual Partners
A variable of interest is the average number of premarital sexual partners
that an age-j person has. Let pij be the number of singles that have had i
sexual partners by age j. First, given the models timing structure, pij = 0 for
i > j. Second, for an age-j single to have 0 sexual partners they must have
had 0 sexual partners at age-(j 1), survive into period j with chance , and
then either remain unmatched with probability 1   or match with odds ,
decide not to marry with likelihood W (w), and not to have premarital sex
with chance L(l). Therefore, p0j = p
0
j 1[1    + W (w)L(l)]. Likewise,
for an age-j single to have j sexual partners they must have had j  1 sexual
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Statistics on the Number of Singles with i Sexual Partners by Age j
Sexual Partners
0 1 2    j
Age 1 p01 = 1   + W (w)L(l) p11 = W (w)[1  L(l)] p21 = 0    pj1 = 0
Age 2 p02 = p
0
1[1   p12 = fW (w)[1  L(l)]p01 p22 = W (w)[1  L(l)]p11    pj2 = 0
+W (w)L(l)] +[(1  ) + W (w)L(l)]p11g
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Age j p0j = p
0
j 1[1   p1j = fW (w)[1  L(l)]p0j 1 p2j = fW (w)[1  L(l)]p1j 1    pjj = W (w)
+W (w)L(l)] +[(1  ) + W (w)L(l)]p1j 1g +[(1  ) + W (w)L(l)]p2j 1g [1  L(l)]pj 1j 1
Table 2: The distribution over the number of premarital sexual partners that
singles have at each age.
partners at age-(j   1) which happens with probability pj 1j 1, survive with
chance , then match and remain single in period j with odds W (w),
and nally decide to have sex with probability 1   L(l). This implies pjj =
W (w)[1  L(l)]pj 1j 1.
Finally, there are exactly three ways for an age-j single to have i sexual
partners, where i < j. First, they could have had i   1 partners at age
j   1, survive, match and remain single, and then have decide to have sex.
There will be W (w)[1  L(l)]pi 1j 1 people in this category. Second, they
could have had i sexual partners in period j   1, survive, but not match.
There will be (1  )pij 1 such singles. Third, they could have had i sexual
partners in period j   1, survive, match, remain single, and decide not to
have sex. The number of singles here is W (w)L(l)pij 1. Hence, p
i
j =
fW (w)[1  L(l)]pi 1j 1 + [(1  ) + W (w)L(l)]pij 1g.
The number of sexual partners that a person has before marriage can be
computed using the statistics in the above table. Let qij be the number of
age-j married people that have had i partners before marriage. First, to have
had j 1 partners by age j you must have had j 1 partners while single up to
age j 1, survived to age j, and then gotten married. So, the number of age-j
married people who have had j   1 partners is qj 1j = [1 W (w)]pj 1j 1.
Second,
qij = [1 W (w)]pij 1 + 2[1 W (w)]pij 2 +   + j i[1 W (w)]pii;
for 0 < i  j   1 and p00  0. On this, note that the earliest you can have i
partners is at age i. At age i there will be pii such singles. Out of this group,
[1  W (w)]pii will marry at age i + 1 and then survive to period j with
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probability j i 1. Likewise, pih singles of age h, for i  h  j   1, will have
had i partners at age h, then gotten married at age h + 1 with probability
[1 W (w)], and subsequently survived to age j with probability j h 1.
Last, for an age-j married person to have 0 sexual partners they must
have survived until age j and gotten married without having premarital sex.
They could marry at any age up to and including j. Thus, to summarize
qij = [1 W (w)]
j 1X
h=i
j hpih; for 0  i  j   1, (5)
where p00  1=. Empirically, it may be desirable to include the person that
you marry as a partner.
Now, the average number of sexual partners that an age-j married person
has is
jX
i=0
iqij
jX
i=0
qij
=
jX
i=0
iqij
mj
; (6)
where mj is the total number of people who are married at age j as dened
in Table 1. A reasonable conjecture might be that the average number of
premarital partners that an age-j married person has is increasing in the
e¢ cacy of contraception, . While this cant be established theoretically
speaking, it still can be true quantitatively.
7.4 Out-of-Wedlock Births
The fraction of matched singles that have an out-of-wedlock birth is (1  
)[1  L(l)]. This can rise or fall with , depending on whether
 [1  L(l)]| {z }
improved contraception
+ (1  )1  dL(l
)
d| {z }
increase in sexual activity
R 0:
This is an elasticity question that can be rephrased as
(1  )
[1  L(l)]
1  dL(l)
d
R 1:
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The shape of the distribution function L(l) will determine whether out-of-
wedlock births for matched singles rise or fall with the odds of safe sex, .
For the population at large, equation (3) gives the fraction who have not
married by age j. Out of this group, the portion  will be matched in the
current period. The fraction 1  W (w) will marry, while the slice W (w)
wont. Therefore the fraction of the nonmarried population that will be
matched and remain single is given by W (w)=f1  [1 W (w)]g. Out of
this, the cut 1 L(l) will be sexually active. Consequently, given the failure
rate, 1   , the fraction of the population up to and including age j that
currently has an out-of-wedlock birth is
(1  )[1  L(l)] W (w
)
1  [1 W (w)]
Pj
i=1 siPj
i=1 
i 1 : (7)
Clearly, this can rise or fall with , because, as was just shown, (1  )[1 
L(l)] can rise or fall in .
8 Calibration
8.1 The Procedure
The quantitative analysis focuses on two periods, namely 1900 and 2000. A
steady state for the model is computed for each of these periods. The model
period is taken to be three months (or a tertile). Functional forms for the
distribution functions governing libido, l, and marriageability, w, need to be
chosen. Let libido be governed by a Weibull distribution. Specically,
L(l) = 1  exp[ (l=)], for ;  > 0,
where  and  are the scale and shape parameters, respectively. Assume that
marriageability has an exponential distribution. In particular,
W (w) = 1  exp[ (w=)], for  > 0.
Here  is the mean of the marriageability distribution.
Two criteria are used for selecting parameter values. First, the values
for some parameters can be assigned from a priori information. Second, the
remaining parameters values are chosen so that the model matches, as well
as possible, a set of data targets. Start with the parameters chosen on the
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basis of a priori information. Denote the discount factor, sans the survival
rate, by . Given this,  = . The discount factor, , is given the standard
value of 0:961=3. People are assumed to have a life span relevant for marriage
decisions of 30 years. The three month survival rate, , is set at 0:99241=3 for
1900 and 0:99971=3 for 2001.3 The failure rates for contraception are taken
directly from the data, as discussed below. Last, the mean for marriageability
distribution, or , is just a normalization. On this, suppose that a solution
to the model has been found for some value of . The same solution obtains
for    if a;O;and  are also multiplied by  > 1. What matters for an
individuals choices are the relative values of abstinence, premarital sex, and
marriage. So, set  = 1:0.
The values for the rest of the parameters are selected to hit a set of
stylized facts. Let Dj represent the jth data target. Likewise, Pj() is
the models prediction for the jth target, as a function of the parameters,
  (a; ;O; ; ), to be selected. These parameter are picked to minimize the
relative predictions error of the model. Therefore,  solves the minimization
problem
min

18X
j=1
!j[
Dj   Pj()
Dj
]2; (8)
where !j is the weight placed on target j. The set of targeted stylized facts
is (where !j = 1 unless indicated otherwise):
1. The median age of marriage.
2. The fraction of women by age group who had ever been married in 1900
and 2000. Each age group for a year has a weight of 1=3.
3. The fraction of women by age group who had premarital sex in 1900
and 2004. Again, each age group for a year is weighted by 1=3.
4. The number of out-of-wedlock births per 1,000 unmarried women in
1920 and 1998.
5. The number of partners (including future husband) before marriage in
1900 and 2000.
3These are in line with the numbers for 20- to 45year-old women reported in the
CDCs National Vital Statistics Reports.
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Parameter Values
Parameter Value, 1900 Value, 2000 Description
Set using ex ante information
J 90 90 # of periods
 3 3 periodicity, months
 0:961=3 0:961=3 discount factor
 0:99241=3 0:99971=3 survival rate
 (1  0:72)1=3 (1  0:18)1=3 Pr(safe sex)
 1.0 1.0 exponential, meanw
Set via calibration routine
 22.7229 22.7229 Weibull, shapel
 0.027 0.027 Weibull, scalel
a 0.027 0.027 abstinence
O 0.1806 0.1806 out-of-wedlock birth
 0.3359 0.3359 matching rate
Table 3: Parameter Values. The parameters set on the basis of ex ante
information are discussed in the text. The remaining parameters are selected
in line with the minimization routine (8).
The parameters values that result from the calibration procedure are listed
in Table 3. All parameters values are kept constant across the two steady
states, except for the failure rate of contraception, which is discussed now.
8.2 The Failure Rate for Contraception, 1900 to 2015-
2018
An important ingredient for the quantitative analysis is the failure rate for
contraception. Figure 12 shows the dramatic decline in the failure rate for
contraception starting in 1900 and moving forward to 2015-18. The failure
rate gives the odds of a woman becoming pregnant if she has sex at the
normal frequency for a period of one year. For each year the series harnesses
the frequency distribution over the contraceptive practices used by women.
This will depend on both the contraception technologies that are available
at the time and their di¤usion among sexually active women. The latter
depends upon the dissemination of information about, and the dispensation
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Figure 12: The annual failure rate for contraception, 1900 to 2015-18. The
failure rate series is predicated upon the contraceptive technologies available
at each point in time as well as the usage distribution by women.
of, contraception. It also takes into account that some women wont use
any method, including just withdrawal. Then, to compute the overall failure
rate, the failure rate for each contraception is averaged across the di¤erent
practices using the observed frequency distribution for usage. As can be seen,
engaging in premarital sex in 1900 would have been very risky given the 72
percent odds of pregnancy. By 2015-18, this had dropped to 18 percent.
Further detail on the construction of the failure rates is provided in the Data
Appendix.
8.3 Findings
The upshot of the calibration procedure is presented in Table 4. First, be-
tween 1900 and 2000 the median age of marriage in the United States rose
from 21.9 to 25.1 years. The model does a good job replicating this fact,
with the mean age of marriage moving up from 21.15 to 25.44. In the United
States there is big drop between 1900 and 2000 in the percentage of 15- to
24-year-old women that were ever married; an 11 percentage point drop from
29.62 to 18.17 percent. The model also displays an 11 percentage drop, but
too many women are married in this age group. Additionally, in the model
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for the year 2000 too few women have been married in the 25-to-34 and
35-to-44 age groups.
Second, single women became much more sexually active between 1900
and 2000. In the U.S. data for 1900, only 8 percent of women had experienced
premarital sex by age 20, 14 percent by age 25, and still only 26 percent by
age 30. The model mimics this low level of sexual activity well, with the
corresponding numbers being 12, 18, and 21 percent. It over predicts the
rise in premarital sexual activity. In the 2000 data 76 percent of women had
engaged in premarital sex by age 20, a rise of 68 percentage points, while
in the model 94 percent did, which represents an increase of 82 percentage
points.
Third, over the period in question out-of-wedlock births in the United
States shot up from 8.7 per 1,000 single women to 44.3. There is also a large
increase in the model from 3.4 to 33.6. This represents an increase in the data
of 35.6 pregnancies per 1,000 single women and an increase of 30.2 for the
model. Additionally, single women now have sex with more partners than
in the past. In 1900 women on average had 2.8 partners before marriage,
including her future husband. The corresponding gure in the model is 1.2,
when the future husband is also counted. This rose to 7.0 partners in the 2000
data and to 8.2 for the model. Overall, the model does a good job explaining
the targeted set of facts. The relationship between parameter values and
data targets is inspected by computing the Jacobian for the model. At the
calibrated equilibrium, the parameter values a¤ect premarital sex in 1900
more than in 2000. This makes sense because almost nobody had premarital
sex in 1900 while most 20 year olds have experienced it today. Likewise, the
parameter values have a bigger impact on marriage in 2000 vis à vis 1900. By
similar reasoning, this transpires because marriage was much more prevalent
in 1900 than today.
8.4 Opening the Black Box
The impact that parameter values have on the data targets can be analyzed
by computing the models Jacobian. The response of a data target to a
displacement in the value of a parameter is calculated in elasticity form; i.e.,
[i=Pj()]  dPj()=di is computed for all i and j in (8). It turns out that
(locally) a; ;O; ; and  have a large e¤ect on sexual behavior in 1900, but
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Data Targets
Description Data, 1900 Model, 1900 Data, 2000 Model, 2000
Marriage
Median Age 21.9 21.15 25.1 25.44
Ever Married, %
Age 15-24 29.62 34.93 18.17 23.95
Age 25-34 77.42 73.77 70.25 56.36
Age 35-44 88.90 89.43 86.60 74.96
Premarital Sex, %
By Age 20 8 12 76 94
By Age 25 14 18 87 95
By Age 30 26 21 87 95
O.w.b.s per 1,000 Singles 8.7 3.40 44.3 33.6
Partners before Marriage 2.8 1.18 7.0 8.2
Table 4: Data Targets. All statistics are for women. Data sources are detailed
in the Data Appendix.
little impact on such behavior in 2000. By contrast, the marriage statistics
for 2000 display a bigger response to shifts in the parameters than do the
ones for 1900.
Figure 13 shows how the percentage of women who had premarital sex by
age 25 responds in the two steady states to a change in parameter values. The
impact of a movement in parameter values is much larger for the 1900 steady
state than for the 2000 one, as can be seen by the units on the vertical axes.
In 2000 almost all matched singles in the model are having premarital sex
so the reaction is muted, while for 1900 a small minority are so the response
is much bigger. The reactions make sense too. For example, increasing the
utility from abstinence, a, or the cost of an out-of-wedlock birth, O, reduce
the amount of premarital sex in 1900. Raising the libido shape parameter, ,
which increases the ow of women into premarital sex given the threshold,
results in a higher level of premarital sex. The utility level for abstinence, a,
has a negligible impact on premarital sex in 2000, because almost no matched
singles are abstinent.
Figure 14 does the same thing for the median age of marriage. Now
a displacement in the parameter values has a much larger impact on the
2000 steady state than for the 1900 one, as can be seen by the units on the
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Figure 13: The part of the Jacobian showing the response of the percentage
of women who had premarital sex before age 25 to a displacement in the
parameters. The Jacobian is presented in elasticity form. Note that the
units on the vertical scale for 1900 are much larger than the ones for 2000.
vertical axes. This makes sense. In the 2000 steady state the vast majority of
matched singles choose to have a sexual relationship. So, for example, they
respond to an increase in the cost of out-of-wedlock births, O, by moving
into marriage (or marrying earlier). A rise in the matching rate, , leads to a
delay in marriage for the 2000 steady state, but entices people to marry just
slightly earlier in the 1900 one. This transpires because in the 2000 steady
state the cost of waiting is lower because people can engage in non-marital
sexual relationship. This opportunity is more costly in the 1900 steady state,
so people are less picky about their mate, and hence marry earlier.
9 Conclusions
While fertility has been controlled for eons, premarital sex would have been
too risky for women historically. This began to change in the 19th century
when contraceptive technology improved and information about contracep-
tion disseminated (Section 3). The 19th and 20th century saw improvements
in condoms and spermicides, and the introduction of diaphragms, IUDs, and
the pill. Just as important was the dissemination of information about con-
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Figure 14: The part of the Jacobian showing the response of the median age
of marriage to a displacement in the parameters. The Jacobian is presented
in elasticity form. Note that the units on the vertical scale for 2000 are much
larger than the ones for 1900, the opposite of Figure 13.
traception, often at personal risk for the providers. In America this started
and ended with the crusaders Dr. Charles Knowlton and Margaret Sanger.
The hypothesis here is that advancement in contraception led to a rise in
premarital sex, an increase in out-of-wedlock births, and a fall in the fraction
of population that is married population.
To address this hypothesis a marital search model is constructed. Each
period a single may meet a partner. A person can choose to marry their
partner or not (Section 5). If not, they can decide whether to have a premar-
ital sexual relationship with the person (Section 6). The risk of a premarital
sexual relationship is an out-of-wedlock birth. As contraception improves
this risk is mitigated. It is shown theoretically that a drop in the failure rate
for contraception leads to a decline in the rate of marriage (Section 5), an
increase the fraction of singles who are sexually active (Section 6), a rise in
the proportion of the population that is never married (Section 7), and delay
in the average age of marriage (Section 7).
The theoretical model is then confronted with the U.S. data (in Section
8). The quantitative analysis focuses on two periods in U.S. history; viz, 1900
and 2000. To start with, a time series is constructed measuring the e¢ cacy
36
of contraception. It is shown that the odds of a pregnancy for a sexually
active women dropped dramatically between 1900 and 2015-18. This made
sex much safer for singles. The question then asked is whether the model can
explain, as a function of technological progress in contraception the following
set of facts: the observed decline in marriage between 1900 and 2015-18, the
rise in premarital sex, the increase in out-of-wedlock births, and the uptick
in the number of sexual partners before marriage that occurred. The answer
is yes.
A review of the relevant economics literature on marriage is presented
now.
10 Literature Review
10.1 Contraception and the Age of Marriage
An increasing use of birth control may be a cause of earlier
marriage. For if a young couple can contemplate a marriage with-
out a baby within a year, and hence with only two to provide for,
and perhaps with the bride working at a paying job, we think
there would be more marriage than if a baby is pretty sure to
come within a year and the mother unable to earn any money.
Against this argument is the idea held by some that a young
woman practicing birth control could have sexual intercourse with-
out marrying and without becoming a mother, hence she can have
a man without marrying; and similarly a man can have a woman
without marriage. Thus marriage might be discouraged by the
spread of birth control. Ogburn and Nimko¤ (1955, pp. 89-90)
As a theoretical proposition, Ogburn and Nimko¤ (1955) thought that
the impact of contraception on the age of marriage could go either way.
While they note that (i)t is very di¢ cult to test these ideas with data,
they felt that the rst hypothesis had more currency given that the age
of marriage was decreasing at the timenote the dip in the median age of
marriage between 1940 and 1960 shown in Figure 1. Goldin and Katz (2002)
advance a more modern version of this idea. They highlight two ways in
which better contraception, the pill, changed the lives of college-educated
women in the United States. First, the pill made the returns to investment
in professional careers, such as law and medicine, less uncertain by allowing
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women to better time their fertility decisions. Second, the pill had a thicker
marriage market e¤ect: as more women delayed their entry into marriage,
each individual woman became less concerned about being left out in the
marriage market due to her career choice. In their empirical analysis, Goldin
and Katz (2002) exploit variations across U.S. states in the access of young
unmarried women to the pill. Their most persuasive evidence for a role of
the pill is that its initial di¤usion among single women coincided with, and
is analytically related to, the increase in the age at rst marriage and the
increase in women in professional degree programs(p. 767).
Now, it is clear that fertility was under control well before the 1960s,
as Figure 4 showed. This is not to say that family planning policies, es-
pecially for developing countries, are not important.4 Also, the number of
sexually-active single women had risen dramatically before this timeFigure
3. Furthermore, you can go to professional school while married. This is
more common outside of the United States. The take o¤ in women going to
professional schools started after 1972. The ow of women into higher edu-
cation has started well before this though. By 1972, 42 percent of bachelors
degrees, 41 percent of masters degrees, and 18 percent of doctorates went to
women, which amounted to 42 percent of all non-professional degrees. The
respective numbers in 1900 were 19 percent, 19 percent, 8 percent, and 19
percent. The year 1972 was also when Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments was signed into law. The law prohibited discrimination against women
in any federally-funded education programs. Goldin and Katz (2002) defense
is that its guidelines were not complete until 1975. While Title IXs statutory
language was brief, it still would have been law upon enactment in 1972. Its
likely that colleges and universities changed their admission policies before
1975, especially since there was uncertainty about what they would be legally
liable for. In fact, one could argue that the passage of Title IX was itself
a reaction to the changing place of women in education and the workplace.
On this, see Greenwood, Guner, and Vandenbrouke (2017) for a model where
the passage of womens rights is an endogenous function of the state of the
economy. Last, Myers (2017), who revisits the empirical analysis by Goldin
and Katz (2002), nds that the pill itself had little e¤ect on the age of rst
marriages and births, while liberalized access to abortion had a much larger
4Cavalcanti, Kocharkov, and Santos (2019) introduce unwanted births into a model
of fertility decisions and growth, and show that family planning programs, which reduce
the number of unwanted pregnancies, can generate signicant gains in the educational
attainments of children and hence GDP.
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e¤ect. So, the power of the pill, while important, may be overstated.
Before the pill was available to unmarried women, between its approval by
the FDA in 1960 and the late 1960s or early 1970s, only married women could
access it. Indeed, many U.S. states reduced the legal age of marriage from 21
to 18 during this period. According to Edlund and Machado (2015), these
changes allowed women to marry early, which would be in line with Ogburn
and Nimko¤s (1955) rst idea. Combined with the pill, however, this also
allowed them to widen the window between marriage and rst birth and
improve educational and professional outcomes. Gershoni and Low (2018a)
document how the availability of in vitro fertilization in Israel has led to an
increase in average age at rst marriage. In related work, Gershoni and Low
(2018b) discuss how this increased education levels for women and resulted
in higher paying careers. (Interestingly, Ogburn and Nimko¤ (1955) discuss
the transplantation of ova in their book, but speculated that its e¤ect on the
family would be negligible.)
10.2 Premarital Sex and Out-of-Wedlock Births
Technological advance in contraception allowed women to separate sex from
marriage. This led to a dramatic increase in the fraction of women who
engaged in premarital sex during the 20th century; again see Figure 3. Yet,
despite the improvements in contraceptive technology, out-of-wedlock births
increased as well. Greenwood and Guner (2010) study premarital sex among
teenagers within the context of an equilibrium matching model. In the model
individuals rationally weigh the costs and benets from this risky activity.
Better contraceptives lower the expected cost of premarital sex. In their
quantitative analysis better contraceptives result in both an increase in the
fraction of teenagers having sex and the fraction of them becoming pregnant.
Akerlof, Yellen, and Katz (1996) also focus on this puzzle. They suggest that
better contraceptives, coupled with the availability of abortion, led to the
disappearance of shotgun marriages, and as a result there was an increase in
out-of-wedlock rst births. In their framework prior to a sexual relationship
single women may or may not ask for an implicit promise of marriage in the
event of pregnancy. With the advance of contraception and the legalization of
abortion, men can choose among many sexually active single women. Some
single women who become pregnant may be willing to have an abortion,
others wont. Competition on the marriage market may lead to women who
are opposed to abortion being reluctant to ask for such a promise. But, why
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would men abide by such an implicit promise? (I.e., their equilibrium is
not subgame perfect.) This is left unanswered in Akerlof, Yellen, and Katz
(1996).
One explanation might be that premarital sex and out-of-wedlock births
were stigmatized in yesteryear. Fernandez-Villaverde, Greenwood, and Guner
(2014) model the formation and evolution of such social norms. As premar-
ital sexual activity became safer, parents, churches, and governments had
less incentive to stigmatize premarital sex, given that socialization is a costly
activity. Fernandez-Villaverde, Greenwood, and Guner (2014) formalize this
intuition in a model of intergenerational preference transmission. For models
of preference transmission in other contexts, see Becker (1993), Bisin and
Verdier (2001), and Doepke and Zilibotti (2008).
On the basis of the observed decline of shotgun weddings, Kennes and
Knowles (2019) argue that an important ingredient in the rise of out-of-
wedlock births is an increase in the value of single life (with children) relative
to marriage. Their vehicle for analysis is a repeated-matching model where
women are heterogeneous in the number of previous children and where sin-
gles make decisions each period regarding their sexual activity, birth control,
abortion, and whether to marry if pregnant. Low take-up rates of the pill and
the availability of abortion are critical features in their analysis. Kennes and
Knowles (2019) consider a number of candidates, such as the advent of legal
abortion, lower divorce costs, and increased frictions in shotgun weddings,
that might be responsible for the decline in shotgun marriages. Other things
might also have reduced the value of marriage relative to single life: more
generous welfare benets, rising living standards together with the advent of
labor-saving household technologies, and a lessening of the stigma associated
with an out-of-wedlock birth.
10.3 Other Factors A¤ecting the Timing of Marriage
Clearly factors other than contraceptives a¤ect the timing of marriage. Brown-
ing, Chiappori, and Weiss (2014), Greenwood, Guner, and Vandenbroucke
(2017), and Stevensen and Wolfers (2007) provide reviews of the literature.
10.3.1 Rising Wages
In his classic treatment of the topic, Becker (1991, p. 350) states that the
family in the United States changed more rapidly (since 1950) than during
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any equivalent period since the founding of colonies. I believe that a major
cause of these changes is the growth in the earning power of women as the
American economy developed. Higher relative earnings reduce the gains
from marriage for women and allows them to be more choosy. Regalia and
Rios-Rull (2001) formalize this idea in a quantitative model and show that
increases in the relative earnings of women can potentially account for almost
ninety percent of the observed rise in the share of single women since the mid-
1970s. Shephard (2019) also focuses on the e¤ects of a narrowing gender wage
gap on marital outcomes. He builds a rich life-cycle equilibrium model with
endogenous human capital accumulation, fertility, and home production to
study time allocation and marriage decisions. His simulations show that
decline in the gender wage gap since the 1980s is able to generate an increase
in female employment, a decline in male employment, an increase in the age-
of-rst marriage for women, and a reduction in the marital age gap between
men and women.
Other aspects of wage structure can also a¤ect the incentive to get mar-
ried. Olivetti (2006) documents that the returns to labor market experience
increased for women since the 1970s and this was an important factor for
the rising female labor supply. Caucutt, Guner, and Knowles (2002) show
that, within a matching model of marriage, this will also increase the in-
centives of women to delay both fertility and marriage. Santos and Weiss
(2016), instead, focus on the rising labor income volatility since the 1970s,
and show that if marriage involves consumption commitments, such as chil-
dren or housing, then a rise in income volatility will delay entry into marriage.
10.3.2 Household Technologies
Another key force that shaped families in the United States and elsewhere
was the dramatic improvements in households technologies. Improvements in
household durables freed women from housework and allowed them to enter
the labor forcesee Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu (2005). (Relatedly,
Albanesi and Olivetti, 2016, argue that advances in maternal medicine facil-
itated the entry of young women into the workplace.) These forces reduced
the benets from traditional marriages; to wit, a breadwinner husband and a
housekeeper wife. Greenwood and Guner (2009) integrate home production
into a search model of marriage, and show that better household technologies
can account for a signicant part of the rise in divorce, the fall in marriage,
and the increase in married female labor-force participation that occurred
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during the later half of the twentieth century. According to Greenwood and
Guner (2009, p. 233), the reduction of the economic benets of marriage
allowed the modern criteria of mutual attraction between mates to come to
the fore, a trend from economics to romancein the words of Ogburn and
Nimko¤ (1955).They also show how improvements in household technology
and increases in income can explain the increase in marriage between 1940
and 1960for one more time, recall Figure 1.5
As marriage declined in the United States, there has also been a rise in
assortative mating, the tendency of people with similar educational attain-
ments to marry each other (Chiappori, Selanie, and Weiss, 2017, and Green-
wood, Guner, Kocharkov, and Santos, 2014). Greenwood, Guner, Kocharkov,
and Santos (2016) develop a model, with heterogenous agents, of marriage,
divorce, educational attainment, and married female labor-force participa-
tion. They show how a rise in the college premium together labor-saving
technological progress in the household sector, led to a decline marriage, an
increase married female labor-force participation, and widening inequality
in the United States. The induced changes in labor-force participation and
marriage play an important role in amplifying the impact of shifts in the
wage structure on inequality.
10.3.3 The Welfare State
The expansion of welfare state, in particular social assistance to single moth-
ers with children, has often been pointed to as another important force that
has shaped U.S. families. There are mixed views about this idea. The empir-
ical evidence in favor of the idea, which relies on cross-time and cross-state
variations in welfare policies, has been weaksee Mo¢ tt (1992) for an early
review and Mo¢ tt, Pheland, and Miller (2019) for a more recent analy-
sis. Structural models such as Aiyagari, Greenwood, and Guner (2000) and
Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles (2000) predict that less generous welfare
payments should reduce the number of single woman. In line with this predic-
tion, Low, Meghir, Pistaferri, and Voena (2018) show that the 1996 welfare
reform did result in more women remaining married.
5The idea is that technological progress in the household sector, together with rising
living standards, at rst made it easier for young couples to leave their parentshomes and
establish married households and then later on in time for singles to leave their parentss
homes and establish single households before marriage. That is, there is a trend over time
toward smaller and smaller households.
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10.3.4 Lack of Marriageable Men
Finally, a large literature in sociology and demography, emphasizes the lack
of marriageable men as a potential factor for the decline of marriage in the
United States. The basic idea, following Wilson and Neckerman (1987),
is that low wage growth, declining manufacturing, and rising incarceration
in recent decades made marriageable men scarce. Shneider, Harknett, and
Stimpson (2018) document, for example, that reduced economic prospects
and increased risk of incarceration contributed signicantly to the decline of
marriage in the United States over the last 45 years. Incarceration has also
been proposed as a factor that can explain why blacks marry at a much lower
rate than whites in the United States. Exploiting data cross-state U.S. states,
Charles and Luoh (2010) nd a strong negative e¤ect of male incarceration
rates on the likelihood of women ever getting married. Building on this
intuition, Caucutt, Guner, and Rauh (2018) develop an equilibrium search
model of marriage, divorce, and labor supply that takes into account the
transitions between employment, unemployment, and prison for individuals
by education, gender, and race. They show that if black men had the same
employment and prison transitions as whites, then about half of the racial
marriage gap would be eliminated.
10.3.5 Changes in the Sex Ratio
Since historically it took two sexes, a man and a woman, to form a marriage,
the sex ratio (dened as the number of single men to single women) can a¤ect
marriage decisions. If there is an imbalance in the sex ratio, whoever is on
the short side of the market will have a harder time to nd a partner. When
a marriage is formed, the sex in short supply will have a higher bargaining
power. These features emerge in standard search and matching models (e.g.,
Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles 2000).
What can generate an imbalanced sex ratio? Some candidates are changes
in population growth rates (say a baby boom or baby bust), male incarcer-
ation, sex-biased migration, and wars. Angrist (2002) exploits variations in
migration ows as a natural experiment during the early 20th century in
the United States. He nds that migration, which increased the size of the
male population more for some ethnic groups than others, improved marriage
prospects for women. In particular, it increased the likelihood of marriage
for women and reduced female labor-force participation. The latter is a
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reection of a tilt in household bargaining power toward women. Angrist
(2002, p. 997) provides a quote from a Moroccan female immigrant saying
Every day I meet someone better. I am waiting for the best.Bronson and
Mozzocco (2017) document, by analyzing nearly century of U.S. data, that
higher cohort sizes are associated with higher marriage rates for both men
and women. They nd that variations in cohort sizes can explain a large
variation in marriage rates since the 1930s.
Recent research suggests that the theoretical link between sex ratios and
marriage can be complex. An excellent example is Knowles and Vanden-
broucke (2019) who analyze the aftermath in France of World War I. They
show that after World War I marriage rates increased for both men and
women in France, despite a large drop in the sex ratio. They build a directed
search model of marriage in which young and old men and women have dif-
ferent preferences for marriage. In particular, young men are less inclined to
marry than either old men or young and old women. Due to bleak economic
prospects, World War I was not a good time to marry and raise a familysee
Vandenbroucke (2014) for an analysis of this. This impacted the marriage
rates for older men more than younger ones, because the latter werent as
likely to marry. As a result the stock of single older men was a¤ected more
than for the stock of younger ones. Consequently, following the War the
stock of marriageable men was high despite large casualties; furthermore,
casualties were higher for younger men which compounded the situation.
Bronson and Mozzocco (2018) note that standard models of marriage
would have a di¢ cult time explaining how an increase in cohort size leads
to a rise in the marriage rates for both men and women. Since women
usually marry older men an increase in a cohort would reduce the ratio of
marriageable men to women. A standard model would predict a fall in the
marriage rate for women and a rise in the one for men. To overcome this
prediction, they adapt the standard model so that men can undertake a pre-
marital investment that increases their probability of meeting a potential
spouse (as in Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss 2009). When the population is
growing and men are in a relatively better position in the marriage market,
they have lower incentives for pre-marital investment, which can result in
lower marriage rates for them as well as women. Last, as discussed earlier,
Caucutt, Guner, and Rauh (2018) analyze how the high incarceration (and
unemployment) rates for black males has reduced the stock of marriageable
men and has led to low marriage rates for blacks.
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11 Appendix: BeersSpecication of Letters
Patent
12 Appendix: Theory
Proof of Proposition 5 (Mean and Median Ages of Marriage). Fo-
cus on the mean age of marriage, as given by (4). As can be deduced from
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Table 1, the average age of marriage can be rewritten asPj
i=1 iniPj
i=1 ni
=
Pj
i=1 isi 1Pj
i=1 si 1
; with s0  1=:
Consider the distribution function given by (
Pl
i=1 si 1)=(
Pj
i=1 si 1), for 0 
l  j. Now, the odds of being around and single after i   1 periods are
si 1 = [1  + W (w)]i 1i 2. Therefore,Pl
i=1 si 1Pj
i=1 si 1
=
1  l
1  j , with   [1  + W (w
)]:
It is easy to check the righthand side is decreasing in w. This implies that
the distribution function is stochastically increasing in w in the sense of
rst-order stochastic dominance; i.e., the odds of marrying by age l have de-
creased, while the odds of marrying after age l have increased. Trivially, the
integer i is increasing in i. Consequently, by the theorem of rst-order sto-
chastic dominance [see Hadar and Russell (1971)] the average age of marriage
must be increasing in w and hence  by Proposition 1.
The median age of marriage lies between l and l + 1, wherePl
i=1 niPj
i=1 ni
=
Pl
i=1 si 1Pj
i=1 si 1
 0:5 
Pl+1
i=1 niPj
i=1 ni
=
Pl+1
i=1 si 1Pj
i=1 si 1
:
There are two cases to consider. The rst case is where the median age of
marriage moves out of the interval [l; l + 1]. From the above analysis, the
far righthand side is decreasing in w. This implies that the median age of
marriage will increase in this situation. The second case is where the median
age of marriage remains within the interval [l; l+1]. Here the median age of
marriage is xed at (l+ l+1)=2 = l:5. So in the second case the median age
of marriage is nondecreasing in the e¢ cacy of contraception.
13 Appendix: Data Sources
13.1 Figures and Tables
 Figure 1 (fraction of the female population, 18-30, never married, 1880-
2015): The data for 1880-1990 is from the Historical Statistics of the
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United States: Millennial Edition (Table Aa614-683). The data for
2000-2015 is based on the authorscalculations from the U.S. Census
Bureaus American Community Survey.
 Figure 1 (median age at rst marriage, 1880-2018): United States Cen-
sus Bureau, Historical Marital Status Tables, Table MS-2.
 Figure 2 (percentage of births to unmarried women, 1920-2017): For
1920 and 1930, see Cutright (1972, Table 1, p. 383); for the data be-
tween 1940 and 1999, see Ventura and Bachrach (2000, Table 1, p.
17); for 1999-2013, see Curtin, Ventura, and Martinez (2014); for 2014,
2015, 2016, and 2017, see National Vital Statistics Reports-Births: Fi-
nal Data for the corresponding years.
 Figure 2 (non-marital births by age group per 1,000 women): Com-
puted for the years 1940 to 1990 from Historical Statistics of the United
States (Tables Aa614-683 and Ab264-305). For the years 2000 and
2007, the numbers are calculated using the birth rates for unmarried
women, as given in the National Vital Statistics Reports, and the frac-
tion of unmarried women, calculated using IPUMS USA.
 Figure 3 (premarital sex): For births cohorts pre-1900 to 1910-1919,
the data is taken from Kinsey et al. (1953, Table 83, p. 339). The data
for the later cohorts is from Wu, Martin, and England (2018, Table 3,
p. 733).
 Figure 3 (number partners before marriage): The data for the birth
cohorts from pre-1900 to 1910-1919 are from Kinsey et al. (1953, Table
78, p. 336). The numbers for the later cohorts are based on authors
calculations from the National Health and Social Life Survey (NHSLS).
The numbers presume the woman had premarital sex with her future
husband.
 Figure 4 (total fertility rate for white women): The numbers for 1800
to 1990 are from the Historical Statistics of the United States (Table
Ab52-117). For the years 1991 to 2015, the data comes from Martin et
al. (2017, Table 4, p. 21).
 Figure 4 (complementary cumulative distribution functions over chil-
dren ever born): Historical Statistics of the United States (Table Ab498-
535).
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 Figure 12 (annual failure rate for contraception, 1900 to 2015-18): The
annual failure rate data is provided in the last column of Table 6. The
series is constructed from the data presented in Tables 5 and 6 on the
uses and e¤ectiveness of contraception.
 Table 4 (data targets): The fraction of women ever married by age for
1900 comes from the Historical Statistics of the United States: Mil-
lennial Edition, Table Aa614-683. For the year 2000 the data is from
the U.S. Census Bureaus brief Marital Status: 2000.The number of
out-of-wedlock births per 1,000 unmarried women in 1920 derives from
Cutright (1972, Table 1, p. 383). The corresponding number for 1998
is taken from the Historical Statistics of the United States: Millennial
Edition, Table Ab264-305. The fractions of women who had premarital
sex in 1900 are taken from Kinsey et al. (1953, Table 83, p. 339). For
2004 the numbers are in line with Wu, Martin, and England (2018, Ta-
ble 3, p. 733). In particular, the fraction for age 25 is set equal to the
fraction found for age 30, which is what the Wu, Martin, and England
(2018) data strongly suggests. For 1900 the number of partners before
marriage is for the before-1900 cohort listed in Kinsey et al (1953, Ta-
ble 78, p. 336). The number for 2000 is based on authorscalculations
from the 1992 National Health and Social Life Survey (NHSLS) and
pertains to women born between 1963 and 1972.
 Tables 5 and 6 (use and e¤ectiveness of contraception): See the detailed
discussion below.
13.2 Contraceptive Use
Table 5 presents data on the use of contraception. For construction of the
data before 1985, see Greenwood and Guner (2010). For 1985-2008, the num-
bers are taken from Mosher (2010, Table 3, p. 20). the data for 2010-18 are
based on authorscalculations from the National Survey of Family Growth
(waves from 2006-10 to 2015-17). The usage of multiple contraceptives by
users was not reported until the 1995 NSFG. After that year, the sum across
di¤erent methods is more than the total fraction who use any method. In
Table 5 the percentage distribution across di¤erent methods is normalized
to sum up to the total fraction who use any method. The othermethods
category includes the use of diaphragms, cervical caps, IUDs, vaginal spermi-
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Contraceptive Use at First Premarital Intercourse, %
Period none pill condom withdrawal other
1900-59 61.4 - 9.42 11.19 17.99
1960-64 61.4 4.2 21.9 7.3 5.3
1965-69 54.2 8.6 24.0 9.5 3.7
1970-74 55.6 12.1 21.0 7.3 4.0
1975-79 53.5 12.8 22.0 7.5 4.2
1980-82 46.9 14.2 26.7 8.4 3.8
1983-88 34.6 12.1 41.8 8.9 2.6
1985-89 34.0 13.7 43.2 6.8 2.3
1990-94 30.3 15.4 47.3 4.5 2.5
1995-99 27.5 17.0 48.7 5.0 1.8
2000-04 24.2 17.0 53.4 2.5 2.9
2005-08 15.9 15.1 56.4 7.1 5.4
2010-14 19.4 21.9 51.3 3.3 4.2
2015-17 10.0 19.9 56.2 3.4 10.5
Table 5: The table shows contraception use at rst premarital intercourse at
various point in time. All numbers are expressed as percentages.
cides (such as foams, jellies, creams and sponges), the rhythm method, and
injections and implants which were introduced in 1990s.
13.3 Contraceptive E¤ectiveness
Table 6 gives the annual failure rates for condoms, the pill, withdrawal,
and other methods. For construction of the failure rates before 2000, see
Greenwood and Guner (2010). For 2000-2008, the failure rates for no method,
pill, condom and withdrawal are taken from Hatcher et al. (2004, Table 9-2,
p. 226). For 2010-2014, the failure rates come from Hatcher et al. (2011,
Table 3-2, p. 50). For 2015-2018, they derive from Hatcher et al. (2018,
Table 3-2, p. 100).
Given the small number of people using other methods the results are
not very sensitive to the assumption made regarding their e¤ectiveness. In
Greenwood and Guner (2003), the e¤ectiveness of other methods is assumed
to 20% until the end of 1980s and 10% afterwards, until around 2000. Given
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Effectiveness of Contraception (annual failure rates), %
Period none pill condom withdrawal other All (technology)
1900-59 85.0 - 45.0 59.2 50.0 72.05
1960-64 85.0 7.5 17.5 22.5 20.0 59.04
1965-69 85.0 7.5 17.5 22.5 20.0 53.79
1970-74 85.0 7.5 17.5 22.5 20.0 54.29
1975-79 85.0 7.5 17.5 22.5 20.0 52.81
1980-82 85.0 7.5 17.5 22.5 20.0 48.25
1983-88 85.0 3.4 11.0 20.5 20.0 36.76
1985-89 85.0 3.4 11.0 20.5 10.0 35.73
1990-94 85.0 5.5 14.5 20.5 10.0 34.63
1995-99 85.0 5.5 14.5 23.0 10.0 32.69
2000-04 85.0 8.0 15.0 27.0 5.0 30.76
2005-08 85.0 8.0 15.0 27.0 5.0 25.38
2010-14 85.0 9.0 9.0 22.0 5.0 28.63
2015-17 85.0 7.0 7.0 20.0 5.0 18.39
Table 6: The table shows the annual failure rates for contraception. All
numbers are expressed as percentages.
the continuous improvements in many contraceptions, such as the IUD, di-
aphragm, and introduction of new ones. e.g. the patch, a failure rate of 5%
is assumed for other methods since 2000.
The last column in 6 gives annual failure rate across all contraceptive
technologies. This is the series plotted in Figure 12. To do this, an average
is computed over the e¤ectiveness of each method of birth control listed in
Table 6. When doing this each practice is weighted by its yearly frequency
of use shown in Table 5.
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